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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRELIMINARY HEARING-
The United States Supreme Court has held that, if a defendant is
given a preliminary hearing, it is a "critical stage" in a state's criminal
prosecution in which the defendant is entitled to the aid of counsel
and the appointment of counsel if necessary.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
Petitioners were convicted in an Alabama Circuit Court of assault with
intent to murder. They were given a preliminary hearing which was
not a required step in an Alabama criminal prosecution.' They were
not represented by counsel. Nothing occurring at the preliminary hear-
ing was used at the trial.2 Petitioners argued that the preliminary
hearing was a "critical stage" of the prosecution and that the state
unconstitutionally denied them the assistance of counsel by failing
to provide them with appointed attorneys at the hearing.3 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 after the Alabama Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction 5 and the Alabama Supreme Court
denied review.6
In Powell v. Alabama7 the Court held that a person accused of a
contract period has run-NLRB v. Warrensburg Board & Paper Corp., 340 F.2d
920 (2nd Cir. 1965).
b. a party may not seek to vitiate his voluntary agreement to participate in multi-
employer bargaining by engaging in an untimely withdrawal from such a unit-
Universal Insulation Corp. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1966).
c. an employer may not avoid his obligation to seek a good faith agreement with
the statutory representative of his employees as to the terms and conditions of
employment by unilaterally altering such terms and conditions-Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
d. an employer may not dissipate the good faith collective bargaining requirement
by engaging in individual bargaining-National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S.
350 (1940).
e. an employee may not bargain with a union which has not been freely chosen by
his employees as their representative-Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319
U.S. 533 (1943).
f. an employer may not refuse to sign a contract where all of the terms of the con-
tract have been settled except one which involves a nonmandatory bargaining
subject-NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
1. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), Citing Ex parte Campbell 278 Ala. 114, 176
So. 2d 242 (1965).
2. Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Pointer bars the admission of testimony
given at a preliminary hearing where the defendant did not have the benefit of the aid of
counsel. This rule was "scrupulously observed" in Coleman v. State, 44 Ala. 429, 433, 211
So. 2d 917, 921 (1968).
3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
4. 394 U.S. 916 (1969).
5. 44 Ala. App. 429, 211 So. 2d 917 (1968).
6. 282 Ala. 725, 211 So. 2d 927 (1968).
7. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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crime "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him." The instant case points out that this constitu-
tional principle has been extended beyond the presence of counsel at
trial.9 In order to extend this principle the Court has applied the test,
annunciated in United States v. Wade,'0 to determine whether the pro-
ceeding is a "critical stage."" If it is a "critical stage" the defendant
is entitled to the aid of counsel and the appointment of counsel if
necessary.12 The question asked is "whether potential substantial prej-
udice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and
the ability of counsel to help avoid the prejudice."'3
In applying the test, in the instant case, the Court concluded that
the preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" since the lawyer's assis-
tance was essential to protect the accused's basic right to a fair trial.1
4
The preliminary hearing would afford the lawyer an opportunity to
gather information in order to impeach the state's witnesses; preserve
testimony of witnesses favorable to the accused who may not appear
at the trial; discover the state's case and therfore be able to prepare a
proper defense; and, to make such arguments as the necessity for a
psychiatric examination or bail.' 5 The lawyer might further be able
to expose weaknesses in the state's case, possibly causing the magistrate
to refuse to bind the accused over.'8
The Court also stated that the preliminary hearing was a "critical
stage" even if the lower court prohibited the state's use at the trial of
8. Id. at 69.
9. 399 U.S. at 7. The court cited the following cases: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), right to counsel at a pretrial lineup;
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), right to counsel at a pretrial type of arraignment;
See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), right
to counsel at a pretrial custodial interrogation. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964).
10. 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
11. It is suggested that the origin of the phrase "critical stage" may be found in Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 59, where the Court stated:
... the circumstance lends emphasis to the conclusion that during perhaps the most
critical period (emphasis added) of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to
say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when
consultation, thorough going investigation and preparation were vitally important
the defendants did not have the aid of counsel .. . although they were as much
entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
12. See note 9.
13. 388 U.S. at 227.
14. 399 U.S. at 9. Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion objected to the right to
a "fair trial as conceived by judges." He said:
... our Constitution and Bill of Rights did not .. .use any such vague, indefinite,
and elastic language . . .I still prefer to trust the liberty of the citizen to the plain
language of the Constitution rather than to the sense of fairness of particular judges.
Id. at 12-13.
15. Id at 9.
16. Id.
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anything that occurred at the preliminary hearing, where the defendant
did not have a lawyer. 17
The right to have a preliminary hearing is not a constitutional
right,'8 but is granted only when required by statute, 19 and is therefore
subject to limitations in the statute.20 A preliminary hearing is not a
trial but merely a course of procedure.21 Its purposes are to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence against the accused to warrant
presenting his case to the grand jury and if so to set bail if the offense
is bailable. 22
Prior to Coleman, assuming that the jurisdiction had a statute pro-
viding for a preliminary hearing,28 the accused had neither a right to
counsel24 nor was he entitled to have counsel appointed unless it was
required by statute. 25 However, the rule in most of the jurisdictions
was that the accused was entitled to the aid of counsel at his pre-
liminary hearing if it was a "critical stage" of that jurisdiction's crim-
17. Id. See note 2.
18. There is no federally protected right to a preliminary hearing when the crime is
against the United States. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142 (1925). There
is no federal requirement that a state set up a procedure for preliminary hearings. United
States ex rel. Combs v. Denno, 231 F. Supp. 942 (1964). It has been suggested that perhaps
there may soon be a due process right to a preliminary hearing. Comment, 51 IOWA L. REv.
164, 182 (1965-66).
19. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 332 (1961). This source states that the preliminary hearing
was unknown to the common law and, therefore, in absence of statute no preliminary
hearing is necessary. Some writers state, however, that the preliminary hearing was
recognized by the common law. Comment, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 580 (1966-67); Comment,
51 IOWA L. REV. 164, 165 (1965-66).
20. The right to a preliminary hearing may depend upon the crime charged. See State
v. Bennett, 74 Ariz. 6, 242 P.2d 840 (1952), where a preliminary hearing was not granted
because the crime charged was a misdemeanor and not a felony.
21. Carrol v. Turner, 262 F. Supp. 486 (1966). Mr. Chief Justice Burger based his dissent,
in the noted case, on this point. He argued that anyone subjected to a preliminary hearing
should be provided with counsel not because the Constitution commands it but rather
by statute or the rulemaking process. 399 U.S. at 21. He said, "the only relevant determina-
tion is whether a preliminary hearing is a 'criminal prosecution' not whether it is a
'critical event' in the progress of a criminal case." Id. at 23.
22. 44 Ala. App. at 433, 211 So. 2d at 920. See CODE OF ALABAMA, tit. 15, §§ 139, 140, 151
(1940). Although these are the purposes established by the Alabama legislature they are
similar to what may be found in most jurisdictions. A third purpose found in some
jurisdictions is to preserve evidence. See People v. White, 18 Misc. 2d 56, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 585
(1959).
23. It has been reported that only Delaware, Maryland and Vermont have no provision
whatever for a preliminary hearing. Comment, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 580 (1966-67). The
noted case could add impetus to recent arguments for the necessity of preliminary hearings.
See generally Comment, 51 IOWA L. REv. 164 (1965-66); Comment, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 580
(1966-67); Comment, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1416 (1967-68). But as Mr. Justice White points out
in his concurring opinion, ". . . requiring the appointment of counsel may result in fewer
preliminary hearings in jurisdictions where the prosecution is free to avoid them by
taking a case directly to a grand jury. Our ruling may also invite eliminating the prelimi-
nary hearing system entirely." 399 U.S. at 17.




inal procedure. 20 A preliminary hearing not a "critical stage" could
become critical if the trial was likely to be prejudiced as a result of
what happened at the preliminary hearing.27
Coleman, in removing any question as to whether a preliminary
hearing is a "critical stage," seems to be a reasonable development from
the Court's decisions in which the right to aid of counsel has been re-
quired.28 How critical a stage can be said to be is questionable where
the Court in a subsequent decision refuses to apply the holding retro-
actively.
In Wade the pretrial lineup was held to be a "critical stage" because
of the "innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously
and even crucially . . . derogate from a fair trial."2 9 However, the
Court's analysis was inconsistent because as critical as the Court said
the pretrial lineup was, it was not so critical as to compel the Court to
apply the ruling retroactively in Stovall v. Denno.30 This inconsistency
is an argument that can be added to those arguments3l that have al-
ready attacked the Court's technique of prospectively applying con-
stitutional rules of criminal procedure.32
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Stovall, argued that the majority
opinion, by keeping people in jail who were convicted on the basis
of unconstitutional evidence, was not only depriving them of a con-
stitutional trial but also subjecting them to a "rank discrimination." 33
26. Pearce v. Cox, 354 F.2d 884 (1965).
27. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). The preliminary hearing was held to
be a "critical stage" where petitioner entered a plea of guilty without the aid of counsel.
The Court quoting from Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961), said: "Only the
presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to
him and to plead intelligently."
28. See note 9.
29. 388 U.S. at 288.
30. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). This case was decided on the same day as Wade and Gilbert.
It did not involve a pretrial lineup; rather, the defendant was taken to a hospital to be
identified by the victim. It should be noted that the defendants in Wade and Gilbert
benefited from the decision only to avoid the consequences of this constitutional rule of
criminal procedure standing as mere dictum. Id. at 301.
31. Among the articles are Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A
Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cmi. L. REv. 719 (1965-66); Currier, Time and Change
in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965).
32. Stovall is the extent to which the Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), test for
determining when to apply a constitutional rule of criminal procedure retroactively can
be taken. Linkletter denied retroactive application of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
to cases not yet final. The application and development of the test up to Stovall can be
traced through the following cases: Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966), applying Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), to cases not yet final; Johnson
v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) applying Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), to cases in which the trial had begun
on or after the date the rules were announced.
33. 388 U.S. at 304.
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He stated that the Court, having interpreted the Constitution, could
not legislate when the provisions would take effect by "weighing
'countervailing interests.' "84
Subsequent to Stovall, the Court in Desist v. United States35 again
refused to apply a constitutional rule of criminal procedure retro-
actively. Although the case did not involve the application of the
"critical stage" analysis, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent is relevant in that
it attacked prospective overruling for the unequal treatment3 6 inherent
in the device.37 He argued that the Court "departs from basic judicial
tradition" 8 when it randomly selects, among many similarly situated
defendants, which ones will benefit from the Court's decision.3 9 Harlan
concluded that "retroactivity" must be rethought because the Court
is presently in the midst of "doctrinal confusion. '40
Since the Court in Coleman, made no mention as to whether the
rule was to be applied retroactively,41 it is reasonable to assume that
there will be a subsequent case raising this question. It is hoped that the
Court at that time will choose to reevaluate its views on the retroactive
application of constitutional rules of criminal procedure.
Ross Weiss
34. Id. See also 381 U.S. at 640, (Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Linkletter). By "counter-
vailing interests," Mr. Justice Black is referring to the Linkletter test as applied in
Stovall.
35. 394 U.S. 244 (1969). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), denied retroactive
effect.
36. Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in Desist argued that this technique was not
"the administration of justice with an equal hand." 394 U.S. at 255. He pointed out that
in Miranda eighty cases raised the same question but only four benefited from the rule.
37. See, Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge Made Law to Prospective Effect Only:
"Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting," 51 MARQ. L. REv. 254, 267 (1965).
38. The tradition is that of releasing a criminal "because the government has offended
a constitutional principle in the conduct of his case." 384 U.S. at 258.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The assumption that a decision determining the meaning of the Constitution must
be applied retroactively is no longer controlling as to constitutional rules of criminal pro-
cedure in light of Linkletter and the cases that followed. See note 32.
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